Introduction
Political scientists have long exhibited an interest in the connection between religion and political culture. In particular, there has been a growing body of recent literature attempting to understand the relationship between Islam and modernity. One question at the heart of the debate is whether Islam, in the sense of a religion or a civilization, is compatible with democracy (Kubba, 1996; Lewis, 1996; Najjar, 1958) .
Throughout history, overwhelmingly the most common type of regime in the Islamic world has been autocracy (Lewis, 1996) . Scholars have firmly established that the third wave of democratization has not yet reached the Muslim world, particularly in the Arab Middle East (Rizzo, et al, 2007) . According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2007 (Kekic, 2007) which provides a complete 'score card' of democracy for over 160 countries, Muslim societies constitute the great majority of the fifty-five countries categorized as authoritarian regimes. A small number of countries fall into the hybrid regime and flawed democracy. No full democracy with an Islamic majority exists.
There are different views on why democracy does not easily take root in Muslim countries. Fish (2002) studies the causal link between Islamic religious tradition and regime type, controlling for a set of potentially influential factors such as economic development and socio-cultural division. He labels Muslim countries as 'democratic underachievers' and suggests that the subordination of women helps account for part of the link between Islam and authoritarianism. In his paper titled 'Engendering Democracy and Islam in the Arab World', Faqir (1997) shares the view that women's liberalization, equality and democracy are intimately connected; the absence of participatory democracy in most Arab countries is closely associated with the under-representation of women in politics. Some observers, particularly Western observers attribute the type of democratic deficit to cultural factors.
Political culture theory argues that culture matters. Deeply rooted public values and attitudes affect citizen's acceptance of different types of regime (Nathan, 2007) . Regarding Islamic countries in particular, it is argued that the lack of resentment toward authoritarianism and the absence of appreciation for democracy are inherent traits of the Islamic political culture (Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 1996) . The Western and Islamic world, according to Samuel Huntington, remain deeply divided in democratic values. Unlike Western Christianity, Islamic values are said to discourage representative democracy and encourage non-secular authoritarianism (Chandler, 2006) . Similarly, Fukuyama (2001) advances a cultural theory, arguing that Islam has very little in common with modern democracy. Whereas democracy requires openness, pluralism, and tolerance of diversity, Islam, he and others argue, encourages intellectual conformity and an uncritical acceptance of authority (Tessler, 2003) . Najjar examines the basic teachings and institutions of Islam and illustrates the anti-democratic nature of Islam as follows:
"In Islam the individual's rights and freedoms are those prescribed by the [divine] law; he can only choose to obey or disobey. The Western notion of individual freedom and natural rights, which is limited only by the freedom of others, is alien to Muslim theory […] A true Muslim will have very serious difficulties resolving the conflict between his loyalty to the Koran and his belief in democracy. The absolute sovereignty of God cannot be reconciled with the sovereignty of men." (Najjar, 1958) Others reject the cultural allegation that Islam is resistant to democracy. Modernization theorists posit that modernization encourages the spread of democracy. Successful economic development eventually brings pervasive cultural change which will produce a more liberal and tolerant public (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) . From a modernist perspective, Muslim nations are no exception compared to other non-developed countries. The incompatibility between Islam and democracy cannot be reduced to religion as the only factor. There are more factors to look at such as industrialization, urbanization, literacy, distribution of economic and intellectual resources, etc (AlBraizat, 2002 (2002) suggests that there is no significant evidence that Islamic culture predicts attitudes toward democracy; instead, human development and political opportunity structures explain the absence of democracy in the Arab world. Mark Tessler (2003) , too, found no significant general relationship between religion and democratic attitudes based on his empirical work from four Arab countries in which the WVS has been conducted, and concludes that strong Islamic attachments do not discourage or prevent the emergence of support for democracy. In addition, Inglehart and Norris (2004 ) examine WVS 1995 -2001 pooled sample data and suggest that far from a clash of values, there is a minimal difference between the Muslim world and the West in their political attitudes. The divide, instead, is over social values toward gender equality and sexual liberalization (pg. 154).
The present study aims to contribute to the on-going debate on the topic by studying the correlations between religion and support for democracy of ordinary citizens with the latest available World Values Survey (WVS) 2005 data. We compare the nine Islamic nations for which data in the WVS are available to eleven predominantly Catholic nations. We selected the group of Catholic countries in the WVS data set for two reasons. First, many of these countries are in Latin America, making their level of economic development comparable to the richer Islamic nations. The set of Protestant nations would consist of rich Western countries, much more different from the Islamic world in terms of economic development and liberal history. Also, Catholic nations have a history of strong Church involvement in their governance as well as explicit guidance in many of the moral issues such as abortion and sex outside of marriage that are used in the WVS to measure tolerance -arguably an important supporting factor for a healthy democracy. Our empirical results confirm earlier findings suggesting that there is widespread support for democracy among both devout Muslims and practicing Catholics. But, democracy lovers from the Catholic countries conceive democracy differently. They consistently demonstrate greater tolerance of diversity, social trust, stronger support for gender equality and a more self-expressive value orientation, while the reverse is true for the Muslims who have a more instrumental view of democracy: they do not aspire to greater tolerance or civic engagement but rather hope that a democratic government brings more prosperity to their country.
Data and Methodology
We employ data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted in 2005 and 2006.
The WVS is an extensive, global academic survey which studies the worldviews and value profiles of the public on a wide variety of issues, including religion, gender roles, economy, government, family and work relations, etc.
3 In this paper, we focus on a small set of the WVS questions which relate to religion and democracy. Nationally representative data sets of at least some one thousand adults are taken from the nine Islamic countries and eleven Catholic countries for which the latest data is
available. An overview of the countries is shown in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
Malaysia is the richest Islamic nation in our sample, somewhat richer than Turkey and Iran and much more developed than the other six Muslim countries. It is at about the same level of GDP per capita as Argentina, Chile and Mexico. As a whole, the group of Catholic countries is more developed, but the seven Latin-American countries and Poland are quite comparable to the richer Islamic countries in the sample; it is just the three developed nations of France, Italy and Spain that are at a much higher level of GDP per capita.
The empirical analysis is carried out for the individual respondents, both for each country separately and for aggregate samples created by pooling the unweighted national data sets. Since all the survey questions have ordinal answers -sometimes 0 for a no and 1 for a yes; usually a scale from 1 to 4 or 1 to 10 for different degrees of agreement with a value statement -least squares techniques are not appropriate. Throughout the paper we use maximum-likelihood algorithms that have been designed for processing categorical survey answers. The objective of our research is to identify and study different groups of respondents on various issues related to governance and democracy. That makes cluster analysis a natural way to describe and analyze such data. The "Latent Gold" software offers a new generation of cluster analysis that does not rely on arbitrary measures of "distance" to classify cases into segments. Instead, it defines homogeneity in terms of probabilities -cases in the same latent class are similar to each other because their responses are generated by the same probability distribution (Vermunt and Magdison, 2004) . The algorithm extracts a number of clusters from the data in such a way that inside each cluster the responses to the different questions (the indicator variables) have independent distributions. The algorithm allows also for additional variables for which that requirement does not hold but which are useful for assigning respondents to the different clusters (the covariates)
4 .
This way of modelling has advantages over the traditional approaches:
1. It can cope with categorical data, whereas factor analysis and related techniques were designed for continuous variables.
2. There is no need to reduce the number of responses on each question to two.
3. All models are the outcome of an optimizing process, thus avoiding the arbitrariness of traditional cluster analysis or factor analysis in determining the number of clusters or factors.
In addition, the Latent Class cluster models are able to identify distinct patterns of association in an effective manner, regardless of whether the underlying relationship between the variables is monotonous or not. In economics many relationships are monotonous in two related variables.
Higher price, lower quantity demanded; higher inflation, weaker exchange rate. (Yamaguchi, 2000) .
Religiosity and Importance of Democracy
In this analysis, support for democracy is measured by a survey question asking 'How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?' Respondents are to provide their answers on a 10-point scale, ranging from (1) 'Not at all important' to (10) 'Absolutely important'.
Figures 1 and 2 show the proportions of respondents attaching various degrees of importance to democracy for the Catholic and Muslim pooled samples respectively. It is obvious that the response distributions do not differ much, consistent with the findings from several previous studies (Inglehart, 2003; Tessler et al, 2006; The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005 [ Figure 1 about here]
[ Figure 2 about here] Support for democracy cannot be considered solid if people are just giving lip service to it (Inglehart, 2003 [ Figure 3 about here]
We now proceed to explore how religiosity (degree of personal piety), affects people's attitudes toward governance. In countries like France and Spain, there are large numbers of progressive rationalists, opponents of organized religion with 'modern' attitudes in areas such as gender equality, tolerance of diverse social behaviours and strong supporters of a lively democracy. At the same time, amongst pious Catholics in these two countries, there has historically been a group that was very conservative in its attitudes and more tempted by a strong leader than by a vigorous democracy. But do such patterns hold in other parts of the world, particularly Muslim states?
With the question on 'Importance of democracy' as the indicator ("dependent variable") in our model we select religiosity as our first covariate ("explanatory variable"). The WVS includes a few variables that deal with various aspects of religiosity, two of which are commonly studied in the 5 Earlier waves of WVS (1995; 2000) also included additional questions on support for democratic ideals and performance, measuring the extent to which people endorse statements such as 'Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling', 'Democracies aren't good at maintaining order', 'Democracy may have problems but is better than any other form of government'. It would be desirable to also study these questions as another indicator but unfortunately, such data are not available in the current survey for our sample.
literature, one being religious participation/ involvement and the other strength of religious beliefs (Afkhami, 2008; Canetti-Nisim, 2004; Inglehart and Norris, 2004; Karpov, 2002; Tan, 2006) . (2008) studied pilgrims who were selected by ballot to travel from Pakistan to Mecca for the Hajj. They returned more religiously observant from Saudi Arabia and also more tolerant and sympathetic to gender equality, as a result of exposure to and interaction with Hajjis from around the world. On the other hand, social identity theory suggests that a heightened attachment to a group through interaction may be accompanied by negative feelings toward the outside groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1986) . Participation in religious social networks that typically occurs between like-minded people may reinforce a strong collective group identity. Group-oriented thinking in turn leads to more aggressive attitudes or prejudice toward outsiders. Studies point to the evidence that frequent church attendance and prayer are positively correlated with the tendency to endorse authoritarianism (Leak and Randall, 1995; Steiber, 1980) . Hence, it seems that while religious social interaction may generate a liberalized effect that leads to a positive evaluation of democracy, it is equally likely to produce a counterworking effect which could promote antipathy towards others.
The two contrasting forces may cancel out each other, giving an overall insignificant impact of the practice variable. We therefore exclude the practice variable and prefer the belief variable as our measure of religiosity.
Past research has shown that socioeconomic status is an important predictor of political attitudes (Ellision and Musick, 1993; Shu, 2004; Tessler, 2003) . Our models include three control variables for Database" and slicing our data accordingly into rural and urban segments for each country.
For comparability across countries, we present results from a 3-cluster model for every country. 2 clusters per country would not give enough detail; 4 clusters or more (results available on request) tends to produce very small clusters for most countries that do not contribute to the analysis of the broad pattern and may safely be ignored. given by 64 percent of all respondents; we combine these two as the pro-democracy group. Answers 1-5 are given by 9.7 percent; these we combine on the other side of the spectrum. Within each group, we further categorize respondents as either "rationalist' in the sense of not being very religious or those being highly religious. The dichotomous measures for each criterion result in four potential clusters. The four clusters presented in the table do not exhaustively capture the entire national sample however. This is because we want to study important clusters with distinct characteristics, in which respondents hold strong views on the variables. Respondents with moderate or neutral answers -those who fall outside the boundaries for the belief and democracy variables will not be included. Also, small cluster with a size less than 5 percent of the sample is not shown in the table.
[ Table 2 about here]
The first column in the thesis, arguing that the more religious in the Muslim world would be against democratization, does not hold up to empirical testing. We conform that undemocratic believers exist (see column four), but nearly always they are a small minority and many more pious people are strongly in favor of democracy.
Note that in countries like Chile, Poland and Malaysia, the religious pro-democratic individuals constitute a small minority of the sample, as can be seen from the table. The majority of the respondents (over 50%) in these three countries, though not captured by our classification, can indeed be loosely given the same label -they are fairly religious, scoring between 8 and 9 on the belief variable and register a high but not extreme level of support for democracy.
Of the three socio-economic variables, education has the strongest positive link to support for democracy in both the Muslim and Catholic countries. In Spain, France, Mexico and Colombia, the most educated cluster is also the group most favorably disposed toward democracy; this is also true in Morocco, Mali and Iran, where the education variable is highly significant. This finding parallels that of Tessler's paper, (2003) , where education is also found to be positively and significantly related to a more favorable judgment of democracy in three Arab countries. Mixed results are obtained for the other two covariates. In Morocco, for example, support for democracy is positively related to the income variable which has a strong influence, whereas in Indonesia, a small, less wealthy minority of (11%) the respondents score 10 -extremely high on the democracy variable.
Also, a pro-democracy attitude is positively associated with rural residence in Burkina Faso but urban residence in Uruguay.
Separately, we examine the effect of one more demographic factor, gender, by a 4-cluster model which pre-determines respondent classes based on gender: cluster one and two are pre-set as the male respondents; cluster three and four are specified as female respondents. For both males and females we divide the total set of respondents in two clusters, one with the more pro-democracy respondents and the other cluster with the males or females who are less keen on democracy. In On the up-side, the observation that gender has little influence on the legitimacy of democracy is encouraging. One may expect that restricted access to education, workforce and political life may [ Figure 4 about here]
[ Figure 5 about here]
The Essence of a Pro-democratic Civic Culture
The evidence accumulated so far runs counter to the argument that Islam is hostile to democracy.
The image of the rationalists championing democracy fits France and Spain but not elsewhere. The finding that democracy has a global appeal has also been highlighted by other public-opinion surveys such as the Gallup Poll Survey, the Pew Global Attitudes Project and some regional Barometer surveys (Chandler, 2006) . Nevertheless, some skeptics suggest that in countries with no or limited experience of democracy, democracy is embraced because of the positive image and legitimacy that it enjoys rather than an appreciation of the outcomes it provides -freedom and liberty (Dalton, et al, 2007) . This raises an interesting question about the substance of the popular support. Does the term 'democracy' convey the same implication across publics in different societies?
Inglehart ( wave of WVS, he analyzes the link between mass attitudes and a society's level of democracy across more than 70 countries, ranging from authoritarian regimes to established democracies. What emerges from this empirical research is that overt support for democracy is only weakly correlated to a society's actual level of democracy. A much more powerful predictor of stable democracy is the extent to which a society has an underlying culture of tolerance, trust, political activism, well-being, and the extent to which people value freedom of speech and self-expression. Such features, according to Inglehart, are crucial in determining whether democracy survives over the long term. Putnam (1993) investigates culture and government in Italy and reaches the same conclusion that adherence of certain civic attitudes such as tolerance, trust and political equality has a powerful bearing on the viability of democracy.
We thus proceed to examine the linkage between the general explicit measure of 'Importance of democracy' and a set of more implicit values underpinning a pro-democratic civic culture. Our approach differs from Inglehart's in that we look at correlations between indicators of political culture and mass preference for democracy and not a society's level of democracy. While Inglehart attempts to make a cross-level linkage between micro-level attitudes, denominated as political culture, and macro-level democracy, our analyses are made exclusively at a micro-level, where all variables are attitudinal items elicited from individual respondents.
We identify several WVS questions as follows to represent some of the cultural qualities of democracy 6 , though none of these values refer explicitly to democracy itself:
(1) Tolerance of diversity. This includes tolerance of racial diversity and tolerance of divergent social behavior such as homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce, euthanasia and suicide. Each of these items is measured on a 10-point scale, where 1 denotes 'never justifiable' and 10 'always justifiable'.
(2) Support for gender equality in work, politics, and education. This measures the level of agreement with the following: 'when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women'; 'On the whole, men make better business executive than women do'; 'On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do'; 'A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl'. Answers are coded in four categories: '1 = Agree strongly', '2 = Agree', '3 = Disagree' and '4 = Strongly disagree'.
(3) Interpersonal trust. This includes an indicator of general trust in other people and the trust in people of different religion and nationality. The former is measured on a continuum ranging from '1 = people would try to take advantage of you' to '10 = people try to be fair'. The latter is originally measured on a 5-point scale where 1 is coded for 'Trust completely' and 5 'Not trust at all'. We have reversed the coding so that higher values represent a more trusting attitude.
In addition, we include two country-level factors -level of democracy and national GDP per capita as control variables in our model, as contextual factors may also significantly affect political attitudes (Fish, 2002) . The former is measured by the Democracy Index (Kekic, 2007) which assigns an overall score to each country based on an assessment of five general aspects of a democracy. The higher the index score, the more democratic a country is. We control for the level of democracy because as Inglehart demonstrates (2003), the existence of a pro-democratic culture is closely linked to the degree of democracy of a society. The quality of democracy in a country is believed to create an environment suitable for the internalization of democratic values (Ben-Nun-Bloom and Arikan, 2009).
The degree of national economic development is also controlled because the Catholic countries as a whole are richer than the Muslim countries. Modernization theory claims that economic, cultural and political changes basically follow a coherent and predictable pattern. In post-industrial societies, people are likely to be more self-expressive, keen on human rights and tolerant of diversity (Flanagan and Lee, 2000; Wong and Wan, 2009) .By controlling for these two national variables, we can more accurately determine whether any difference observed between societies is due to the religious profile of its citizens.
Given that tolerance of diversity, gender equality and social trust are important values embedded in a pro-democratic political culture, we expect to find a positive relationship between these emancipative values and explicit support for democracy measured by the variable on importance of democracy. As Welzel (2006) puts it, support for democracy and emancipative values should be strongly related because democracy is the natural system preferred by people who emphasize human emancipation. Tables 3 to 6 illustrate the outputs for the three cluster models that compare responses between the Catholic and Islamic publics for each cultural component. The variable on importance of God is also included but as an inactive covariate to improve the statistical classification of the clusters.
With regard to racial diversity, an estimated 17 percent of the Catholic publics rate democracy highly important and are also very much tolerant of people from different racial backgrounds, scoring close to the maximum on the scale (see Table 3 ). Such a group also exists in the Muslim countries, where it represents 20 percent of the poll. However, a third cluster from the Muslim countries -the most religious cluster, is found to be equally pro-democratic measured by our indicator but see racial differences as threatening to their country's unity, scoring below 4 on that variable (cluster 2). In the Catholic nations, we do not find such a group of respondents. A small minority (6.4%) of those polled are not so keen on democracy but still lean toward the tolerant end of the continuum (that is, above the midpoint of 5).
[ Table 3 about here]
The pro-democracy cluster in the Muslim countries also holds a more conservative view on certain moral issues (see Table 4 ). Among the six variables, acceptance of homosexuality and divorce correlate strongly with the attitude towards democracy in both the Catholic and Islamic nations; the signs of the correlation however are different. Catholic individuals who are tolerant of homosexuality and divorce display a higher level of support for democracy than do their morally conservative counterparts. In the Muslim world, being pro-democratic does not necessarily imply greater tolerance of social minority groups. This can be seen from cluster 2, where respondents show a very favorable view toward democracy and yet have the most conservative moral standards.
They have zero tolerance of homosexuality and leave little room for the other five issues. This may be due to their strong religious condemnation of those practices (Rizzo, 2007) , as these people are also the most pious believers in God.
[ Table 4 about here]
With regard to equal rights for women, similarly, a 3-cluster model shows that support for democracy and support for gender equality go hand in hand in the Catholic countries, but not in the Muslim countries (See Table 5 ). On the issue of interpersonal trust, Table 6 shows that slightly over half of the respondents (52.1%) from the Catholic sample are highly pro-democratic and also the most trusting compared to other two clusters. In the Muslim sample, the size of the pro-democratic trusting cluster is reduced to 10 percent (cluster 3). Meanwhile, there exists another cluster (cluster 2) which shares the same pro-democratic sentiment but turns out to be the least trusting of others by all three measures.
[ Table 5 about here]
[ Table 6 about here]
Finally, to test the robustness of the results, we create a Social Tolerance Scale using the WVS questions that ask respondents which group of people they would not like to have as neighbours.
The scale is an additive index comprised of five potentially 'undesirable' groups including (1) Table 7 , a very similar pattern emerges as in the previous models. In the Catholic countries, people with the strongest support for democracy are also the most socially tolerant (cluster 1), scoring close to the maximum scale value of 5, whereas in the Muslim countries, democracy lovers exhibit a strong intolerant attitude, tending toward the other side of the scale (cluster 3).
[ Table 7 about here]
By way of summing up, Figure 6 gives a graphical representation of the important differences we observe between societies. It shows the proportions of individuals who score 9 or above on the democracy variable in the models we run from Tables 3-7. In particular, we distinguish two types of democracy supporters. Bars arrayed to the left of the vertical axis represent 'formal supporters', people who react favorably to the term democracy but attach little importance to civic values, scoring below the midpoint of the scale for a given value item, i.e. question on racial diversity, trust, gender equality, etc. Those charted along the right side of the vertical axis signify the opposite.
These are committed supporters who emphasize emancipative values and score above the midpoint of the scale on the civic value question.
[ Figure 6 about here]
Note that for every single value item that we study, there is always a sizeable group of committed supporters from the Catholic countries, whereas such committed clusters only exist in two of the five instances for the Muslim respondents and in a much smaller proportion. More strikingly, for every value item, we identify comparable proportions of Muslim respondents on the other side of the axis, who explicitly support democracy but are less inclined to embrace democratic values, and yet such a group is non-existent in the Catholic sample. These findings provides the empirical evidence that there is a strong positive relationship between civic attitudes and overt support for democracy in the Catholic countries, where there is a genuine endorsement of social trust, tolerance and gender equality among supporters of democracy. By contrast, in the Muslim countries, overt support does not necessarily reflect commitment to core democratic values.
We also observe that In Tables 3 and 6 , the Muslim 'formal' cluster has the lowest score on the democracy index; this shows that such respondents come from countries which have a more autocratic government. It could be that their strong desire for democracy stems from disillusionment and frustration with authoritarian governments and a high expectation of democracy in delivering greater social and economic benefits (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) , and this is what we turn to now. Inglehart and Welzel (2005, pp. 268-269) argue that overt support for democracy reflects intrinsic support (democracy valued as an end in itself) only in so far as it is linked with self-expression values, which load heavily on gender equality, trust and tolerance. People who do not emphasize selfexpression values support democracy for instrumental purposes, because they reckon it will bring them prosperity and order, holding that democracies are more successful than other regimes in managing economic development and reducing social tensions. Bratton and Mattes (2000) likewise contend that intrinsic support is based on an appreciation of political freedoms and equal rights that democracy embodies, whereas instrumental support sees a democratic regime as a means to other ends, most commonly the alleviation of poverty and the improvement of living standards.
Substance of Popular Support for Democracy
We demonstrate in section 4 that in Muslim-majority countries, mass preference for democracy loosely embodies core democratic principles that Inglehart label as self-expression values. Indeed, the results of WVS elsewhere place the Muslim countries in a very special location on a global cultural map (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) . While stable democracies tend to be high on both secular-rational values and self-expression, Islamic societies are found in the opposite corner -they are traditional and survival-oriented, attaching more importance to economic and physical security relative to individual freedom and subjective well-being. Esposito and Mogahed (2008) report findings from the Gallup Poll surveys that, when asked about their hopes and dreams of today, many
Muslims cite economic issues as their first desire: better economic conditions, employment opportunities, and improved living standards for a better future.
In order to determine whether popular support for democracy hinges on the government's capacity at developing the economy, we introduce three covariates in our model that tap instrumental motives. These are questions on the understanding of the meaning of democracy, measuring the extent to which respondents view democracy in economic terms; higher scores on the variables indicate stronger instrumental support. Intrinsic support for democracy is measured by the survival/ self-expression index, where higher scores mean being more self-expressive. The three items emphasize the economic and social benefits that one expects a democratic government to provide, as opposed to the inherent liberating qualities of democracy, i.e. its political benefits. We can see from the two-cluster models in Table 8 that, in the Catholic countries, the pious believers are people who attach greater importance to democracy. They associate democracy with better economic performance and are also more likely to endorse self-expression values (with a positive score of 0.68). But in the Muslim countries, religious people who place little emphasis on self-expression values (with a negative score of 0.52) also express clear support for democracy (clusters 2), as they associate democracy more strongly with improved material welfare than a commitment to a set of core democratic principles. This is especially evident in their expectation that democracy helps rectifying income inequality (E224) and promises economic prosperity (E 230).
[ Table 8 about here]
In Table 9 , we look at three additional items that measure public understanding of democracy. It shows the percentage of respondents who consider each of the attributes as an 'essential' characteristic of democracy. First we note that both the Muslim and Catholic publics are equally likely to treat free and fair elections as a defining element of democracy. Specifically, 54 percent of respondents in Muslim-majority countries think of democracy in terms of political procedure of competitive election where people have the right to choose their own leaders, a level not too different from citizens in Catholic-majority countries (52 percent). When it comes to the normative aspect of democracy as opposed to the procedural aspect, a significant minority (44 percent) from the Muslim sample agree that civil liberty is essential to democracy, as compared to 38 percent in Catholic-majority countries. However, the latter is much more likely to identify democracy with greater gender equality, with an average of 61 percent versus 46 percent in Muslim-majority countries. This is in line with our previous finding that the Catholic public is more inclined than Muslim citizens to internalize certain democratic values. On the three items that signal instrumental support for democracy, once again, we observe systematic differences between the two types of society. Individuals in Muslim-majority countries are much more likely (35.6 percent) than those in [ Table 9 about here]
Conclusions
Previous research using public opinion data has shown widespread support for democracy in the Muslim world. The results from the latest wave of World Values Survey confirm this -we found that vast majority of the Muslim publics are keen on democracy as a model of governance with levels of popular support for democracy roughly similar to the Catholic countries. Further, strong attachments to the Islamic religion do not deter believers from embracing democracy; the general assumption that being 'modern' in the sense of favoring democracy means being 'less religious' is thus invalidated.
However, we found systematic evidence that the mass public in the Catholic and Muslim countries diverge on the substance of the support and understanding of the term democracy, after controlling for the levels of democracy and economic development. Support for democracy in the Catholic countries stems from a pro-democratic civic culture that embodies certain distinct attributes such as tolerance of diversity, mutual trust and an emphasis on gender equality. Citizens in Islamic countries on the other hand, endorse the term democracy without necessarily embracing those liberal values arguably crucial for a vigorous and open democracy. Also it appears that defenders of democracy from the Catholic-majority countries identify democracy with its inherent and intrinsic appealgreater freedom of expression, whereas the Muslim public tends to define democracy more exclusively by its economic benefits. People equate democracy more strongly with economic wellbeing relative to subjective well-being, seeing democracy as an instrument to attain social security and economic prosperity.
From the perspective of political culture, our findings suggest that there is a lack of democratic mindset in the Muslim nations, and this may constitute an important factor, among many others, which obstructs the democratization process in Muslim world. Democratic consolidation and sustainability cannot hold up without the commitment of great majority of individuals to liberaldemocratic norms (Canetti-Nisim, 2004; Inglehart, 2003; Tessler, 2003) ; indeed, it is difficult for any system to survive unless an appreciable proportion of its members have internalized the basic values of the system (Esmer, 2003) . It is true that elite orientation and commitment matter, but democratic deliberation also requires mass support for democratic values, and as our data indicates, such support is largely absent in the our sample of Muslim nations. In the Muslim societies, the publics do find democracy appealing but they combine support for democracy with attitudes that would be judged intolerant in today's Western countries.
Unlike Catholic-majority countries, where support for democracy signifies a firm belief in the liberating qualities of democracy, Muslim countries in our sample are more concerned about the need for democracy to bring more prosperity. It follows that such support for democracy is instrumental and hence conditional -it may decline when citizen expectations are not realized, for example in the times of economic downturn or social unrest. Chances are unconvinced democrats may turn to non-elected government or autocratic ruler who promises to deliver jobs and houses.
Not long ago, West European Catholics were considerably more traditional and survival-oriented than they are now; yet their values have shifted over time to become progressively more liberal, tolerant and self-expression oriented in gaining and keeping democracy (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Lewis, 1996; Taagepera, 2003) . In contrast, as Inglehart and Norris documented (2003) in an extensive global study of cultural change, the younger generations in Muslim societies remain as traditional as their parents and grandparents especially toward issues like equal rights for women and sexual liberalization. We concur with the Culturalist theorists that there is a cultural basis for the absence of democracy in the Muslim world -the Islam's democracy deficit has something to do with a deficit in deeper democratic values and an appreciation of freedom and openness at the mass level.
The emergence and consolidation of democracy requires not only a favourable attitude toward democracy per se but also a supportive democratic political culture. Answers are originally coded as '1' if a particular group is mentioned and '0' if not mentioned. We have reversed the scale so that '1' indicates not mentioning and '0' mentioning. Scale value hence ranges from 0 to 5, with larger numbers representing higher levels of social tolerance. The higher the democracy index score, the more democratic a country is. Higher scores on the covariates mean greater social tolerance. (1 = 'never justifiable'; 10 = 'always justifiable') The higher the democracy index score, the more democratic a country is. The higher the democracy index score, the more democratic a country is. The higher the democracy index score, the more democratic a country is. Higher scores on the social tolerance scale indicate higher levels of tolerance (a 5-point scale).
The higher the democracy index score, the more democratic a country is. Higher scores on E224, E227 and E230 indicate stronger instrumental support -the tendency to equate democracy with economic values and social benefits.
Higher scores on the Survival/ self-expression index mean being more self-expressive.
The higher the democracy index score, the more democratic a country is. 
